Possibilities for Peace: Germany\u27s Transformation of a Culture of War by Snyder, S. Elizabeth
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 38 
Issue 2 June - Special Issue on Peace, Conflict 
and War 
Article 10 
2011 
Possibilities for Peace: Germany's Transformation of a Culture of 
War 
S. Elizabeth Snyder 
JFK Special Warfare Center & School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
 Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Social Work Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Snyder, S. Elizabeth (2011) "Possibilities for Peace: Germany's Transformation of a Culture of War," The 
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 38 : Iss. 2 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol38/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Social Work at ScholarWorks at WMU. For more 
information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu. 
Possibilities for Peace:
Germany's Transformation of a Culture of War
S. ELIZABETH SNYDER
Directorate for Regional Studies & Education
JFK Special Warfare Center & School
In reaction to its militarist past, Germany has created a strong
culture of peace, including solid educational and institutional sup-
ports for maintaining popular attitudes critical of war and mili-
tary operations. Germany has been recognized for these efforts by a
number of international organizations, including the United Na-
tions. At the same time, Germany has sought to maintain a policy
of active membership in NATO and active cooperation and partici-
pation in NATO operations. As the United States applies increased
pressure on its NATO allies in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan,
many of the inherent social and political tensions in German policy
have surfaced. The German experience of continuing to build a
culture of peace while simultaneously participating in unpopular
military operations provides a significant case study for all who
would seek to build and expand a culture of peace among nations.
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On January 12, 2009 Germany's then Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier wrote an open letter to newly elected
President Barack Obama, in which he offered the following re-
flections on the continued catalysts for global conflict and the
necessity of seeking more peaceful alternatives.
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2011, Volume XXXVIII, Number 2
181
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
The challenges before us are huge: a transparent and
reliable architecture for the world financial system ...
Establishing trust between East and West. Bridging
different cultures and religions alienated from each
other. Bringing peace and new perspectives where
crises now prevail ... Seeking partners, dispelling
hostile stereotypes-nothing is more important in a
world where radical forces still misuse religious and
cultural differences to stir hatred ... I am convinced
that no one can defeat terrorism and hatred with the
strongest military battalions alone. Peace becomes
possible only once we convince people of a better
alternative to animosity and violence. When we succeed
in winning their minds and hearts. When we help to
make economic development and possible prospects
for life ... Only dialogue and cooperation, not suicide
attacks and Qassam rockets will usher in enduring
peace. ... Without the willingness to comply with
internationally respected ground rules, cooperation
becomes impossible ... We stand for a comprehensive
approach to peace. (Steinmeier, 2009)
Steinmeier's (2009) remarks encapsulate in many respects
Germany's postwar values. His letter highlights the impor-
tance of international economic development, intercultural un-
derstanding and tolerance, the power of diplomacy to resolve
disputes, and the use of military force as a last resort. Perhaps
more than any other nation, Germany has used its warring
past to underscore current imperatives for peace. Germans are
proud of their decades-long pacifism and conscious rejection
of military heroes (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). Germany is an
active European sponsor of events that showcase, educate, and
advocate on behalf of global peacebuilding. Prior to the fall of
the Berlin Wall, Germany hosted a gathering of artists, scien-
tists, writers, and musicians to develop a "counter-project" to
the Cold War stand-off. It was the first nation to establish an
International Society for a Culture of Peace, which mobilizes
and globalizes cooperation to defuse violent conflict. In 2006,
Germany won official recognition by the United Nations for
its 30-year contribution to sustainable peace education and its
staunch refusal to glorify war.
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Gauging Success
Germany's efforts to embrace non-violence as both a po-
litical and cultural ethos is borne out in the country's contin-
ued positive ranking on the Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI,
launched in 2007, rates both developed and developing nations
according to their relative states of peace. The index is com-
posed of 24 indicators, ranging from a nation's level of military
spending to its relations with neighboring countries and the
level of respect for human rights. The Global Peace Index seeks
to determine what cultural attributes and institutions are asso-
ciated with states of peace. Countries most at peace are ranked
first; a lower score indicates a more peaceful society. Non-vola-
tile nations have higher per capita income, greater freedom,
elevated levels of sustainability, and equitable social expendi-
tures. According to the 2010 GPI report, peace creates a society
that promotes human potential and its many diverse forms
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010b). In 2007, Germany
ranked 12th out of 121, compared to a ranking of 96th for the
United States. In 2008, the number of included nations grew to
140. This time, Germany ranked 14th out of 140. The U.S. re-
mained drastically lower, at 97th. The 2010 edition of the Global
Peace Index (based on 144 countries) revealed similar findings.
Germany stands at 16th, the United States at 85th (Institute for
Economics and Peace, 2010a).
Germany's claim to becoming a culture of peace requires an
ongoing assessment of its cultural values and an active pursuit
of broad-based social justice initiatives. Peace practitioners
agree that despite traditional notions that equate peace with
the elimination of war, peace is an evolving concept that em-
braces multiple definitions and approaches. Johan Galtung of
the International Peace Research Institute speaks of a negative
peace or, simply put, the absence of violence (Galtung, 1996).
Peace can also be discussed in terms of deterrence, avoiding
war through a balance of power, or being equally armed for
aggression. A further definition focuses on a positive peace, with
high levels of equity and social justice within and between so-
cieties. The most aspirational of all concepts regarding peace
is the model of a culture of peace, a societal framework that pri-
oritizes the following elements: non-violent conflict resolution;
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universal values of human rights; sustainable development;
cultural diversity; and citizen participation. The year 2010
marked the final year of UNESCO's International Decade for a
Culture of Peace and Non-Violence. The U.N. action, designed
to build peaceful futures for the world's children, prioritized
attitudes and behaviors that reject violence, prevent conflicts
by addressing their root causes, and solve problems through
dialogue and negotiation. The U.N. launched its initiative by
underscoring the centrality of global peacebuilding efforts not
only for human rights advocacy, but for international democ-
ratization and security (UNESCO, 2000).
Whither the Military?
Despite Germany's long-standing commitment to a culture
of peace, the nation's aversion to war is not without detractors.
Critics of a "post-pathos, post-heroic" Germany argue that the
European power manifests a lack of passion for protecting its
freedoms (Kurbjuweit, 2010). Apoll conducted in 2007 revealed
that over 60 percent of Germans believed that their army,
the Bundeswehr, "bolsters Germany's prestige in the Western
world" and has a positive impact on people's lives outside its
borders. By contrast, over a third of those interviewed posited
that military operations have a decidedly negative effect on
security within Germany. In terms of an overall appreciation of
the armed forces, there are stark differences among Germany,
the U.S., and other European countries. When asked if they felt
a sense of gratitude towards their own military, 87 percent of
Americans said yes, as compared to 64 percent in Britain, 52
percent in France, and a meager 30 percent in Germany. The
basic German attitude, say researchers, can best be described
as a product of their history: "a benevolent reserve character-
ized by moderate emotional attachment" (Riecker, 2009, p. 1).
This less than enthusiastic response is borne out by statistics
produced by Germany's own Ministry of Defense. In 2004, for
example, 150,000 Germans were called up for compulsory mil-
itary service. Seventy thousand served in the military. Eighty
thousand served as conscientious objectors, working in non-
military institutions (Weimberg & Ryan, 2007). The subject
of the German military is so sensitive that September 2009
marked the first time soldiers were memorialized since World
War II (Black, 2009).
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Culture or Cowardice?
The German peace movement, some contend, represents a
dangerous dismissal of geo-political realities. This perceived
naivet6 is echoed by the director of Germany's Institute for
International Security Affairs in Berlin. "We tolerate the mili-
tary, but we don't want to know about it" (Peel, 2010b). Others
go one step further. Pacifism implies a categorical refusal
to defend one's nation and therefore betrays democracy.
Proponents of a more security-minded agenda do not deny the
horrors of Germany's militarist past. Nor do they devalue the
nation's success in building a peace-loving society. Support for
a more robust defense apparatus is based on the premise that a
culture of restraint is obsolete in an age of terrorism. While the
German constitution limits the use of armed force to defensive
operations or to emergency NATO assistance, some charge
that the country is hampered by an imbalanced assessment of
its military. The army's restriction to peacekeeping missions
has left the homefront vulnerable. It likewise has demoted
the German soldier to a beneficent warrior "with a rose in his
gun barrel" (Kurbjuweit, 2010). Critics of Germany's anti-war
policy claim that for decades the country has clung to lessons
from the past and left the fighting to others. Such a position,
they say, is no longer tenable. As one commentator posited,
"If you want to stop people who are both trying to kill and
unafraid of dying, chances are you won't be untainted your-
self. That might be hard to swallow, but it's still the truth"
(Neukirch & Supp, 2010).
International Leadership
When it comes to war and peace, Germany is between a
rock and a hard place. German unification struck fear in the
hearts of its European neighbors, who worried the nation
could protect-and expand-its economic interests at gun-
point. A similar anxiety surfaced in 1994 when Germany was
accused of "nationalistic impulses" for considering armed pro-
tection of its trade routes (Peel, 2010b). In the years following
the Wende (turning point) from Cold War politics, Germany
quickly allayed regional angst that it posed a threat to world
peace. It entered the political stage as a team player in shaping
foreign policy and attempted a delicate balance between
185
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
leadership and restraint. Yet, as many analysts observe, the
continuation and exacerbation of global conflict confronts the
German nation with a host of new challenges. Germany's in-
creased involvement in multilateral decision-making raises
expectations that it will contribute not only politically and fi-
nancially, but militarily if necessary. The days of "checkbook
diplomacy" are over.
Observers of German politics, both domestic and foreign,
frequently juxtapose Germany's reconciliation with itself and
its history with the nation's confusion and anxiety about its
role outside its own borders. Timothy Garton Ash, in his 2007
review of the Stasi-related film Das Leben der Anderen (The
Lives of Others), argues that it is precisely, and paradoxically,
the shadow of a violent past that has transformed Germany
into a paragon of peace. Ash (2007) writes:
The Germany in which this film was produced, in
the early years of the twenty-first century, is one of
the most free and civilized countries on earth. In this
Germany, human rights and civil liberties are today
more jealously and effectively protected than ... in
traditional homelands of liberty such as Britain and the
United States. In this good land, the professionalism of
its historians, the investigative skill of its journalists,
the seriousness of its parliamentarians, the generosity
of its funders, the idealism of its priests and moralists,
the creative genius of its writers, and yes, the brilliance
of its filmmakers have all combined to cement in the
world's imagination the most indelible association of
Germany with evil. Yet without these efforts, Germany
would never have become such a good land. In all the
annals of human culture, has there ever been a more
paradoxical achievement? (p. 3)
Ash's (2007) assessment of German high-mindedness and
virtue, born of its Auseinandersetzung (coming-to-terms) with
a warmongering past, contrasts with that of journalists who
accuse the nation of failed leadership on the international
stage. According to these less laudatory spectators, Germany's
foreign policy continues in a state of transition, from a mid-
sized power bolstered by the United States to a cautiously re-
unified country sensitive to European fears, to a team player
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too timid to flex its political muscle. Critics assert that Germany
has repeatedly sacrificed influence for non-aggression. The
language of peace, international understanding, and multilat-
eral approaches is, quite simply, shorthand for cowardice-or
at the very least, a fear of commitment.
Striking a Balance
Germany's Catch 22-damned if they fight, damned if they
don't-is nowhere more apparent than in the country's ex-
pected involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Political debates
during the lead-up to the Iraq War expressed considerable
ambivalence. The central question was whether the nation
could reconcile its identity as a military power, its obliga-
tion to uphold global alliances, and its ongoing commitment
to peace. In the end, Germany opposed the war in Iraq and
refused to join the Coalition Forces. This general suspicion
and critique of military intervention was coupled with persis-
tent advocacy of those values enshrined in a culture of peace.
Germany demanded the closure of the U.S. detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. A German legal team encouraged U.S.
soldier Andr6 Shepherd, who went AWOL in 2007, to apply for
asylum to escape further combat. Shepherd's lawyers cited an
EU mandate that protects deserters who refuse participation
in crimes against peace or humanity (Meyer & Kaiser, 2008).
In 2005, a German federal court challenged U.S. actions in
Iraq, expressing concern that such military incursions failed
to conform to the U.N. charter. As recently as March 2009,
Germany admitted 2,500 refugees from Iraq, granting the dis-
placed persons special resident status.
As Operation Iraqi Freedom nears completion and NATO
increases its presence in Afghanistan, Germany's delicate bal-
ancing act between public opinion and political obligations has
intensified. Germany, along with most of Europe, celebrated
the election of Barack Obama, hoping the new President would
transform transatlantic relations. But Washington expects a lot
from Europe in return, most notably in regions key to U.S. in-
terests, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East,
Russia and China. Germany's Bundeswehr is actively engaged
in anti-terrorism campaigns and supplies warships to safe-
guard shipping off the Horn of Africa. Germany has assured
Israel that in the event of an Iraqi attack it would provide a
187
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missile defense system as it did in 1991 during Desert Storm.
German forces, as part of NATO, are stationed on the Turkish-
Iraqi border as well as in Kuwait.
Germany likewise has assumed a commanding role in ISAF
(International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan. Thus
far Germany has continued to couch its role in terms of human-
itarian missions. Germany's Parliament-approved presence in
Afghanistan has three primary goals: to guarantee security;
to facilitate reconstruction efforts; and to assist Afghan secu-
rity forces in their response to rebel attacks. Former Defense
Minister Franz Josef Jung characterized Germany's contribu-
tion as a comprehensive strategy of "networked security" that
prioritizes infrastructure development, including agriculture,
health and education. He described Germany's role as far-
reaching, yet inextricably tied to the host nation's own mili-
tary and civilian commitment-to enhanced democracy, the
prevention of terrorism, the promotion of human rights and
the rule of law, and an end to extremism and intolerance. For
Jung, Germany's commitment as the third largest NATO force
in the country is crucial to Afghanistan's overall stability. He
therefore expected the German public to honor the bravery of
Germany's troops. "Our soldiers are facing these dangers with
courage and resoluteness," Jung announced, "for which they
deserve our utmost respect and gratitude" (Jung, 2009).
Calls to Action
Nine years into the Afghanistan conflict, the German gov-
ernment finds itself increasingly caught between two contend-
ing forces: pressure from Washington to supply more troops and
growing public antipathy at home (Black, 2009). U.S. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates expressed deep concern over what
he describes as the "demilitarization of Europe" (Editorial,
2010). The growing lack of robust defense capabilities, Gates
argued, creates real or perceived weakness that can precipi-
tate aggression. Furthermore, it diminishes Europe's ability to
respond when necessary. The Defense Secretary concluded his
critique with the following admonishment: Europe's failure to
step up militarily and face the threat of terrorism head-on is
nothing short of "an impediment to real security and peace"
(Schwennicke, 2010). Germany's status as the third largest
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contributor to ISAF did not spare the nation from further
censure by its U.S. partner. Germany's police training program
for Afghan security forces was dismissed as too academic, too
long, and ill-suited to the Afghan context (Dempsey, 2010).
Former ISAF Commander Stanley McChrystal, as well as his
successor David Petraeus, have told Germany to expect and
assume more risks. The generals don't just want more soldiers;
they want them out on foot patrol. Counter-insurgency, the gen-
erals insist, requires direct contact with local Afghans. Large
convoys of German soldiers do more to scare village residents
than build their trust. And the Bundeswehr's limited mandate
creates too much distance from the populations NATO is there
to serve (Gebauer, 2010). "Situational awareness can only be
gained," Petraeus reported, "by interacting face-to-face, not
separated by ballistic glass" (ISAF, 2010). While U.S. military
officers praise Germany's commitment to the alliance, they
are frustrated by the country's continued political debates at
home.
Awakening the Warrior
Germany long avoided the term war to describe its range
of operations in Afghanistan. Germany's refusal to go on the
offensive, combined with a clear NATO directive to assist with
civil reconstruction, allowed the populace to speak of German
operations solely in humanitarian terms. In the early days of
the campaign, the majority of Germans supported a national
military presence in Afghanistan-with the notable caveat that
troop levels were not increased and that Bundeswehr soldiers
did not participate in aggressive combat. The government-
sanctioned escalation of deployments (expected to reach 5,350)
as well as the rising number of civilian and military casualties,
has changed all that. As one journalist reported in June 2010,
Germans "get shot at. They shoot. And they get killed." War is
the only word that fits (Editorial, 2010).
Germany's linguistic struggle over Afghanistan-from
"humanitarian operation," to "robust stabilization mission,"
to "armed conflict," to "war"-is more than mere semantics.
The country's postwar commitment to pacifism, the pillar of
its politics and culture, has ignited a political debate unique in
its intensity. Germany's Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has argued
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consistently that the war in Afghanistan is necessary to prevent
the spread of international terrorism and to keep the strug-
gling nation from descending into chaos (Schwennicke, 2010).
While Merkel acknowledges that a Western-style democracy is
unattainable in the tribal nation, she insists that Germany must
support its NATO partners in creating a more viable govern-
ment and preventing a Taliban or Al-Qaeda stronghold in the
region. German opposition to the Chancellor is wide-ranging.
Merkel has been chastised for attempting to talk Germans
back into war, for abandoning a culture of restraint in favor
of one in which military aggression is "normal, manageable
and appropriate" (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). Merkel is likewise
accused of failing to explain to the German public the reasons
for a more martial approach and for not attending the ceremo-
nies of fallen soldiers (Dempsey, 2010). Others disapprove of
a missing timeline for shifting security tasks to Afghan forces,
thereby allowing Bundeswehr troops to come home (Czuczka,
2009).
A leaked CIA memorandum from March 2010 exposed a
belief among intelligence officials that Germans are largely
apathetic towards the war. According to the memo, public in-
difference allows the German government to continue support
for the mission. The report concedes that an upsurge in mili-
tary or civilian casualties could rapidly turn apathy to hostili-
ty. The CIA suggested a counter-measure that plays to German
fears of "terrorism, opium, and refugees" (Mellen, 2010). Such
attitudes severely underestimate Germany's postwar com-
mitment to diplomacy over deployment. When one looks at
the German homefront, it is clear that public opinion is de-
cidedly against armed intervention. In terms of Afghanistan,
Germany's citizens are quick to point out this unpleasant yet
unavoidable truth: the more soldiers ISAF sends in to fight,
the more Taliban insurgents rise up to attack them. To date,
140,000 NATO soldiers from 43 countries have not been able to
defeat 25,000 Taliban fighters (Neukirch & Supp, 2010).
Defending Peace
Popular opposition to the war is borne out in a series
of recent opinion polls. Interviews conducted in April
2010 revealed that 62% of Germans are against the NATO
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offensive. This number is up from 55% percent in 2009 and
34% in 2005 ("Immer," 2010). Despite Germany's troop pres-
ence in Afghanistan, and Angela Merkel's promises to remain,
Germans are doubtful of ISAF's success. The results of a
survey sponsored by the German Marshall Fund show that
75% of the country is pessimistic about the military campaign,
compared with 62% in the European Union as a whole (Peel,
2010b). German opposition to the war in Afghanistan likewise
is fueled by the financial cost. Official government figures price
the war at $1.2 billion per year, although many set the figure at
three times that amount (Schwennicke, 2010). An opinion poll
conducted in spring 2010 disclosed that 76% of Germans are
in favor of cutting defense spending. Germany's new Defense
Minister, Karl zu Guttenberg, agrees and proposed terminat-
ing compulsory military service in favor of a smaller, profes-
sionalized force (Peel, 2010a). Guttenberg admitted that it is
increasingly difficult to sell the Afghanistan mission to an elec-
torate that has lost faith in its success (Dejevsky, 2010).
Concerns about the monetary burden of the ISAF mission
are far outweighed by mounting fears that Germany is losing
its moral compass. Although many citizens support the idea
of a voluntary military, along with fewer men and women in
uniform, the majority of Germans resist the notion that greater
sacrifices in blood and treasure are required at present. One
columnist aptly noted. that war, whether in Afghanistan or
elsewhere, "transforms not only soldiers, but the society they
return to" (Neukirch & Supp, 2010). German concerns re-
garding the impact of current conflicts are wide-ranging. The
German media released a series of reports exposing major defi-
cits in the Bundeswehr's operations: lack of cooperation with
civilian agencies on reconstruction efforts; lack of equipment
(vehicles, weapons, aircraft) and training; lack of interpret-
ers to interact with locals; and a lack of sufficiently encrypted
computer networks to send mission-critical classified messag-
es (Szandar, 2009).
As of July 2010, the number of Bundeswehr casualties stood
at 47. Despite this relatively small number of German deaths
compared to deaths of U.S. and British soldiers, the German
tolerance for war dead remains low. Former Bundeswehr
Chief of Staff Harald Kujat is convinced that substantive
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discussions regarding Germany's presence in Afghanistan will
be triggered when the "pain threshold is crossed" (Schwennicke,
2010). In Kujat's view, that threshold is quickly approaching, a
view also held by former Defense Minister Peter Struck. Struck
realized as early summer 2003 that Afghanistan was not a
simple "hit and run" operation. In Der Spiegel magazine, he
recounted his trip to Cologne's airport, where he met with the
families of troops killed and maimed in a suicide bomb attack.
"It must have been clear even to the last holdouts that this was
not just an aid mission in uniform." Struck then added that
the faces of the grief-stricken relatives continue to haunt him
(Schwennicke, 2010).
Crisis of Conscience
In contrast to a slate of American films depicting soldiers'
experiences in Afghanistan, February 2009 marked the first
attempt by German television to depict the story of Bundeswehr
troops serving with ISAF. The movie, Willkommen zu Hause
(Welcome Home), is a modern-day version of the 1947 post-
WWII classic Drauflen vor der Tilr (The Man Outside), which
begins with a young soldier's attempted suicide. Willkommen
zu Hause offers a similarly sober view of war and its effects. The
film's protagonist survives a suicide bombing that claimed the
life of his best friend. His return home is a desperate attempt
to reclaim his old life and reconnect to his girlfriend, family,
and friends. As the plot progresses, the soldier's war trauma
gains the upper hand. He cannot sleep, panics at the sound
of breaking glass, and vomits when he smells roasted meat.
The final scenes show the soldier entering a veterans' hospi-
tal, in hopes of finally getting relief. Statistics report that in
2008, 245 German soldiers suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, a significant increase from the 121 cases reported in
2005. Willkommen zu Hause created such public outcry that the
German parliament engaged in a heated debate over the role
of Germany's Defense Ministry in helping soldiers cope with
their emotional wounds. The Bundestag voted unanimously to
assist soldiers in combat operations overseas. Efforts include
the opening of a research institute on the effects of war trauma,
a telephone hotline for soldiers in crisis, and an online network
where troops can talk to one another about their experiences
(Lichtenberger, 2009).
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U.S. tolerance of combat losses in Afghanistan-1,095 as
of mid-August 2010, according to iCasualites.org (Operation
Enduring Freedom: Afghanistan, 2010)-is anathema to the
majority of Germans. High-risk battle strategies are consid-
ered too reckless, too dangerous, and too costly. Yet what most
distinguishes the American homefront from its European
counterpart is not their differing thresholds regarding sol-
diers killed or wounded; it is how many civilians are counted
as collateral damage. Markus Kaim, in his assessment of the
growing German opposition, made the following observation:
Germany's discomfort has much less to do with the death of
their own troops. What worries Germans most is that German
soldiers are killing Afghans (Black, 2009). The turning point in
German public opinion came on September 4,2009. A fuel tanker
convoy traveling in the German-patrolled area of Kunduz prov-
ince was captured by the Taliban. The insurgent forces then
ordered local villagers to the site to collect the hijacked fuel.
Learning of the attack, German colonel Georg Klein ordered
two American fighter jets to strike. More than 140 Afghans
died, many of whom were civilians. Before Kunduz, the war
in Afghanistan was a hard sell. It was far away. The threat to
Europe was obscure. And it violated Germans' commitment to
pacifism. After Kunduz, new questions arose about NATO's ap-
parent disregard for innocent Afghans. The Bundestag offered
assurances that the army's chief priority in Afghanistan is to
protect the civilian population. It also approved the payment
of reparations to the families of the Kunduz victims. For many
Germans, however, the response of military officials revealed
more concern about their reputations and careers than about
the charred bodies of unfortunate bystanders (Gebauer, Goetz,
& Medick, 2009). The tide of popular opinion took another
major turn in April 2, 2010, when German troops mistakenly
shot dead six Afghan soldiers following an ambush in which
three Bundeswehr troops also died (Mellen, 2010).
Reconsidering Reconciliation
Germany's involvement in ISAF continues to be a political
and cultural minefield. In May 2010, Germany's five leading
research institutes added their voice to the nation's growing
rejection of the NATO mission and challenged the ability of
current operations to bring stability to the war-torn country.
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In their report, the respected think tanks argue that the ces-
sation of conflict is contingent on a power-sharing deal with
the Taliban-something U.S. forces have thus far dismissed.
They insist that reconciliation must replace NATO's reliance
on counter-insurgency measures. German peace and security
experts overwhelmingly favor Hamid Karzai's strategy of
talking to the Taliban, not bombing them (Hessler, 2010).
Germany's growing abhorrence towards the violence in
Afghanistan marks a significant return to its most cherished
postwar values. The rejection of military engagement-whether
by its own troops or those of its allies-signals an unwilling-
ness to compromise long-term peace for short-term geo-po-
litical gains. Despite persistent counter-arguments that the
nation must show "patience and fortitude" to see the mission
through, German citizens remain unconvinced (Kaim, 2007).
The country may owe much to its NATO partners, but soli-
darity has its limits. It is amid this groundswell of support for
peacebuilding over war fighting that, in August 2010, the army
announced a major offensive in Afghanistan's north. Weary of
NATO criticism that German soldiers are too passive in the
face of the insurgency, senior Bundeswehr officers opted to
risk increased casualties-and political backlash at home-to
improve their standing among their partners. The new German
commander in Kunduz province confirmed that attacks to
eliminate the Taliban would begin in October and underscored
his resolve to "get this done" (Phillips, 2010). It is ironic that
this military sweep would be achieved using Germany's exist-
ing reconstruction teams, that is, soldiers serving in a protec-
tive capacity as first responders and development specialists.
The Way Forward
Germany's embattled commitment to its postwar ethos
offers a compelling case study regarding the possibilities for
peace in a time of war. As the debate continues, scholars of
German political and cultural history pose key questions re-
garding Germany's future on the world stage. Will the nation
continue to promote peacebuilding and diplomacy? Will it
stand as a model for other nations, convincing them we can
no longer afford, in Vandana Shiva's words, the "luxury of
violence"? (Shiva, 2002). It is worth noting that the recent 40'
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anniversary of the Northeast Modem Language Association
featured a panel on "Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Reading
Resolution in German Literature and Culture." The call for
papers reads:
With conflicts raging in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and
the Palestinian Territories, Sudan and elsewhere, war is
a central global concern. But is there room in the age of
terror for forgiveness and reconciliation? ... It has often
been said that the history of Germany in the 201 century
is the history of war and violence, but can cultural
expressions ... provide valuable insights into processes
of resolution and reconciliation? (Scott, 2009)
In attempting to respond to this question, I encourage all of
us-sociologists, historians, literary critics and others-to con-
sider once again the essential distinction between simply man-
aging conflict and truly seeking peace. The German experience
provides a constructive road map in this regard. Current polit-
ical and cultural debates reveal a robust, public, and nuanced
examination of what it means to be "secure," both as a single
nation and as a community of nations. In July 2010, Germany's
Foreign Office presented a comprehensive plan devoted to bal-
ancing the country's security concerns with sustained checks
on military expenditures and engagements. In reference to
Afghanistan, the strategic blueprint underscored Germany's
long diplomatic history with Afghanistan and highlighted the
presence of 90,000 Afghans for whom Germany has become,
more than any other European nation, "a second home"
(Federal Foreign Office, 2010). The report reminds its interna-
tional partners that Germany was the first to host U.N. talks
on the future of Afghanistan. Afghan leaders traveled again
to Germany to bolster the role of civil society and to discuss
the de-escalation of armed force. Germany's ongoing commit-
ment to reconstruction, development, good governance and
security is evidenced by heightened financial assistance to the
region, which is scheduled to double between 2009-2013. Key
projects are the construction of educational facilities to renew
Afghanistan's rich cultural heritage, as well as outreach centers
to help demobilize and reintegrate former combatants. While
the debate about ISAF continues, I am reminded of Timothy
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Garton Ash's reference to that "good land" of journalists, schol-
ars and artists indelibly marked by a history of conflict. Seen in
this context, it is fitting that the Goethe Institute, Germany's pre-
miere agency for culture, is sponsoring workshops in Kabul on
music, theater, photography and film. It likewise pledged to
restore historical monuments in Kabul, Bamiyan and Herat-
many of which were laid waste by war.
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